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DISABILITY, RECIPROCITY, AND "REAL EFFICIENCY": A
UNIFIED APPROACH
AMY L. WAX*

INTRODUCTION

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) requires
private employers to offer reasonable accommodation to disabled
persons capable of performing the core elements of a job.' These
employment-related "accommodation mandates"2 have come under
attack by economists and economically-minded legal scholars.' The
main thrust of the attack focuses on efficiency: The claim is that the
costs of implementing the statutory commands outweigh the
benefits.
Efficiency-based objections to workplace accommodation mandates stand in contrast to responses to other parts of the ADA. The
statute requires that facilities open to the public, including
restaurants, businesses, hotels, and transportation, be made
accessible to the disabled.' Although these access mandates have
been criticized as unwieldy and unfair to businesses, efficiencybased attacks have been muted. Whether these mandates increase
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.S., Yale University; M.D., Harvard
University; J.D., Columbia University.
1. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(bX5XA) (2000).
2. See generally Christine Jolls,Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223 (2000)
(discussing the effect of the mandates on the accommodated workers).
3. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT

DISCRIMINATIONLAWS 349,480-94 (1992); Sherwin Rosen,DisabilityAccommodationand the
Labor Market, in DISABILITY AND WORK: INCENTIVES, RIGHTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 18
(Carolyn Weaver ed., 1991) [hereinafter DISABILITY AND WORK]; Mark Kelman, Market
Discriminationand Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 840-55 (2001). Contra Jolls, supra note 2,
at 290-300; Michael Ashley Stein, LaborMarkets, Rationality and Workers with Disability,
21 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 314 (2000) (arguing that accommodating disabled workers is
not burdensome for employers).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
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net social welfare-or whether they just effect a redistribution of a
fixed or shrinking pie towards the disabled and away from
others-has not been a central issue in the debate. For one thing,
it is hard to deny that these accommodations will require business
owners to spend money without any guarantee of recouping their
costs.5 Thus, businesses will almost certainly find themselves outof-pocket to some extent. Second, the efficiency of mandated access
is not easy to calculate because it requires putting a price on
enhancements in the quality of lives for people with diverse disabilities and preferences. For these reasons among others, supporters and detractors of access mandates may be less resistant to
assigning as much or more importance to distributional priorities
and simple justice as to efficiency concerns.
With respect to employment mandates, in contrast, it is
understandable that "simple justice" might take a back seat. Labor
markets are a key part of a productive economy that is geared
towards generating wealth. There is a strong assumption-at least
in some quarters-that labor markets produce the greatest amount
of wealth overall when they operate along free market lines to the
greatest possible extent. An employment regime that maximizes the
size of the pie is desirable because it generates the potential to
make everybody better off. Even if those who are well-off (and ablebodied) benefit more, reallocation from winners to losers can turn
a Kaldor-Hicks efficient situation into a Pareto-superior one.' Thus,
although the intangible or indirect benefits of ADA-mandated
inclusiveness in employment should not be ignored,7 the fear is that
the tangible and intangible benefits the ADA brings to disabled
workers may be outweighed by potentially significant economic
5. Although enhanced business from disabled customers may sometimes help mitigate
the cost of providing access, I am unaware of any serious claim that this effect will invariably
make up for the additional costs.
6. For a discussion of the basics of Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiencies, see generally
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 1.2 (5th ed. 1998). See also infra notes
18-25 and accompanying text (discussing pros and cons of regulating directly instead of
allowing free markets to operate and redistributing surplus resources through tax and
transfer programs).
7. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and
the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 3-5 (2000) (arguing that participation in paid work is a key
component of social citizenship and a full and satisfying life in the community); Vicki Schultz,
Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1886-92 (2000) (same).
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costs overall. So powerful is the pull of the efficiency goal for labor
markets that even supporters of the ADA are at pains to show that
the statute advances efficiency and that the employment mandates
are cost-effective for employers and for society overall. There is a
reluctance to embrace head-on the position that even if all of us--or
some of us-must sacrifice wealth, welfare, or utility to put disabled
people to work and to integrate them into the mainstream workforce, those goals are worth the price.
Although ultimately reserving judgment on whether emphasis on
the efficiency of ADA job mandates is warranted, this Article
assumes the importance of that goal as a given. The Article argues
that many analyses of the cost-effectiveness of ADA employment
mandates suffer from a narrowness of scope and a lack of social and
political realism that impede a clear picture of the statute's true
economic consequences. The confusion has led efficiency-conscious
ADA supporters to make strained and overly optimistic assertions
about the productivity of the disabled. I argue that these efforts are
unnecessary. One can defend the ADA without assuming that every
disabled job-seeker is as productive as otherwise qualified ablebodied persons or can be made so through accommodation. Rather,
the argument is that the ADA may well effect a net increase in
social welfare under a more plausible and modest assumption:
Many disabled persons, even if somewhat less productive than the
rest of the population, can nevertheless be productively employed.
In offering an analysis of the cost-effectiveness of the ADA, this
Article assumes the following social and legal background conditions. First, our society will honor a minimum commitment to
provide basic support to those who cannot support themselves
through no fault of their own. This includes medically disabled
persons who, regardless of their potential productivity with or
without special accommodation, may be regarded by employers as
unqualified for available jobs as currently structured.8
8. Disability law grants benefits to those unable to perform any job, not to those whom
employers are simply unwilling to hire. The standard for benefits in practice is not so pure,
because there is potential in the law for overinclusiveness. This is partly due to the use of
a standing "listing" of conditions that establishes entitlement regardless of actual work
potential, and partly to the system's inability accurately to distinguish between inability to
do the job and the failure to get hired to do the job. As a result, disability benefits may
sometimes be paid to persons who are unemployed for the latter reason as well as the former.
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Second, labor markets, both by custom and by law, do not operate
according to perfect neoclassical principles. Although deviations
from the ideal can be traced to many sources, some distortions in
labor markets are deliberately imposed by minimum wage and
equal pay statutes that set an effective floor on compensation.
These legal restrictions may perturb or inflate wage structures at
many levels. In addition, information deficits and customary
practices grounded in the operation of human psychology may keep
employers from paying market-clearing wages that reflect each
employee's individual marginal productivity in a particular job.
Rather, compensation for ajob may reflect the average productivity
of a narrow band of "qualified" individuals. But disabled persons
who are otherwise "qualified" may deviate from that average
significantly, if only because they require costly accommodations
that detract from their net productivity. The end result may be that
employers must hire many of the disabled at wages that exceed
their "true" worth on a market geared to marginal productivity.
These two background conditions-society's commitment to
provide subsistence to the "worthy" poor, and imperfect labor
markets that tend to overcompensate the disabled-may combine
to produce a situation in which, absent the legal commands of the
ADA, employers will shun some disabled workers who could be
productively employed, and the taxpayer will end up supporting
them. If markets were perfect, disabled persons capable of
producing net value would be hired at a market clearing wage that
reflects all costs and benefits for the employer, including any special
costs of employing them. This means they would be hired at a level
of compensation that reflects their "true" marginal productivity,
even if that level is less than it would be if they were not disabled.
But if, as hypothesized, employers were to find themselves paying
more than that, many of these persons would not be hired. To be
sure, some employers will shun disabled workers due to irrational
fears, stereotypes, and unwarranted assumptions about their
ability to function on the job. Some discrimination against the
disabled can thus be characterized as "irrational" statistical
In addition, some disabled workers cannot work at any job without accommodation. But a
person need not prove that failure to accommodate him is unlawful to qualify for benefits.
See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
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discrimination. But this discussion assumes that some significant
portion of this unwillingness to hire is traceable to a rational form
of statistical discrimination: Employer decisions are based in part
on accurate assumptions about shortfalls in productivity, exacerbated by factors militating towards "sticky' or excessive
compensation.
If potentially productive disabled persons are kept out of the
market by employers' fears of excessive costs, they will have to find
support elsewhere. As a practical matter, many persons with a
medical condition impeding job performance, if unable to find work,
will be granted benefits financed at taxpayer expense. Society as a
whole foots the bill through social welfare programs that assign
resources to the "deserving" unemployed. Indeed, the very existence
of a safety net for the unemployed disabled tends to pull marginally
disabled workers out of the workforce, which adds to the ranks of
the disabled unemployed. The effect of these factors on social norms
surrounding work will also play a role. The more numerous the
disabled unemployed, the more substantial and salient the benefits
program that supports them. As more disabled persons leave the
workforce for the disability rolls, others feel more comfortable
joining them (and more comfortable pursuing employment opportunities with less vigor).
In sum, a society without the ADA would be one in which many
of the potentially productive disabled would not expect to work or
would be unable to find work tailored to their tastes and skills.
Because so many would be unemployed, non-work would be
normatively more acceptable. This would cause the costs of staying
out of the workforce to be further reduced, which would in turn
accelerate a norm shift towards non-work.
The ADA seeks to correct this situation by mandating the
accommodation and employment of disabled persons, albeit at an
inflated wage in some cases. This saves taxpayers the costs of
supporting them in idleness, but at some cost to the employer who
must hire them and accommodate them at an inefficient wage.
Arguably the "able-bodied" employees who are displaced or whose
9. See KARL E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 284-85 (6th ed.

2002) (discussing connection between "sticky" wages and unemployment).
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terms of employment are altered by the ADA's effects on labor
markets, pay some of this cost as well. If the disabled employee is
sufficiently productive, however, the result could be net positive for
society as a whole. Thus, although employers in real labor markets
will sometimes be unwilling to hire and accommodate potentially
productive disabled persons, it might still be in society's interests
that those persons work even if they are paid more than they are
worth. If disabled persons do not earn a "living wage," the rest of us
must support them.
On this view, the ADA can be seen as a way for taxpayers to
unload some of the costs of supporting the disabled population onto
employers who, in turn, may try to impose those costs on other
groups, such as nondisabled employees and consumers. In effect,
the ADA operates as a mechanism for the broad range of taxpayers
to impose "negative externalities" on employers and the business
community. This situation introduces the possibility of a disconnect
between what is in employers' interest (refusing to hire or
accommodate many productive disabled persons at prevailing rates
of pay) and what is good for society as a whole (putting the
productive disabled to work). In effect, the ADA has the potential
to create a divergence between social and private benefits. Although
that divergence does not make inefficiency inevitable, it does pose
the danger of an inefficient result in some cases. As explained more
fully below, the potential for arbitrary and unfair cost shifts implicit
in the ADA scheme suggests that the ADA may stand in need of
reform more on fairness than on efficiency grounds.
It should be noted, however, that this analysis is based on the
somewhat idealistic assumption that employers actually comply
with ADA requirements, either because they obey the law
spontaneously or because enforcement is effective enough to make
the mandates stick. If employers can be forced to comply with ADA
mandates, and those mandates, by hypothesis, impose costs
employers would otherwise choose to avoid, then the ADA would be
expected to cause an increase in the number of disabled persons
with jobs. Whether the ADA has in fact had that effect is currently
a subject of intense study and scholarly debate.1" If, as some assert,
10. Compare Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Coneequences of Employment
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the ADA has caused a decline in employment among the disabled,
this is most likely due to imperfect enforcement which allows
employers to evade the mandate by hiring fewer disabled persons. "
But that evasive tactic also suggests that compliance with the ADA
hiring and accommodation requirements is, indeed, expensive for
many employers, and that employers will find it easier to avoid
hiring disabled workers than to recoup their added costs by paying
those workers less. 2
I. CONDITIONAL RECIPROCITY AND THE COMMITMENT TO THE
"DESERVING" UNEMPLOYED

I have elsewhere explored the idea of conditional reciprocity as a
principle of social organization that commands widespread political
Protection?The Case of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915,917, 949
(2001) (attributing findings of reduced employment levels of disabled persons to the high
costs of accommodation), with Julie Hotchkiss, A Closer Look at the Employment Impact of
the Americans with Disabilities Act 23 (Mar. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (providing evidence that the reduction in the employment rate among the disabled
is actually a product of "a reclassification of non-disabled labor force non-participants as
disabled" in order to evade the increased stringency of welfare reform and take advantage
of more generous disability benefits). See also Douglas Kruse & Lisa Schur, Employment of
People with DisabilitiesFollowingthe ADA, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 55TH ANNUAL MEETING
(Industrial Relations Research Assoc. ed., 2003) (forthcoming Fall 2003) (manuscript at 27,
on file with author) (suggesting that the evidence on the effects of the ADA does not clearly
prove either an increase or a reduction in employment levels for the disabled). An inherent
difficulty that potentially skews research data is the continuing lack of a clear-cut definition
of disability. Id.; Thomas Hale, The Lack of a Disability Measure in Today's Current
PopulationsSurvey, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 2001, at 38,39 (noting that the definition of
disability found in the March CPS supplement, which is a commonly used source of data for
these ADA claims, is distinctly different from the ADA definition).
11. See J.H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2003)
(manuscript at 40, on file with author) (discussing the academic argument that the difficulty
of enforcement causes levels of employment among the disabled to fall), available at
http://www.ssrn.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2003).
12. See Jolls, supra note 2, at 260 (describing tactics employers can use to pass the costs
of accommodation on to workers, with the effectiveness of such tactics depending on the
"bite" of equal pay compared to the effectiveness of the nondiscrimination requirements).
The ADA may be even more costly for employers in medium-sized firms, which are
nonetheless sufficiently large to be covered by the statute. These firms will find it more
difficult to pass costs on to employees. See Verkerke, supra note 11. In fact, some employers
may defy the ADA by avoiding hiring the disabled despite effective enforcement if they view
accommodation measures as more costly than the threat of ADA-related litigation. See id.
(noting that "disemployment effects also appear to have been larger in states in which there
have been more ADA-related discrimination charges").
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support in the United States and in modern industrial societies
generally. 3 A system of distribution based on social reciprocity
principles can be viewed as an informal insurance scheme whereby the community pledges minimum support during periods of
economic misfortune or distress. In exchange for this guarantee,
individuals owe a duty not to call upon group resources unnecessarily and to achieve self-support to the extent possible
through their own reasonable efforts in the labor market. As I have
noted elsewhere, this principle amounts to "recognizing the
community's duty to make up any shortfall between what persons
can command on their own in the market or through private
arrangements [with other, productive persons] and an amount
sufficient to support a minimally decent standard of living." 4 Under
these circumstances, the collective, in effect, undertakes to act as
a surety of basic subsistence on the condition that individuals make
a reasonable effort to minimize the assistance needed through selfhelp efforts. What constitutes a "reasonable effort" depends on
myriad economic and social conditions as well as conventions about
how hard people are expected to work, which in turn depends on
how much effort most people actually expend on their own behalf.15
What does reciprocity have to do with the ADA and the
assessment of the efficiency of workplace mandates? Our social
welfare system generally-and our policies towards the disabled
specifically--are deeply informed by the logic of reciprocity, which
has far-reaching political currency, resonance, and support."
Consequently, we must accept that our society is not prepared to
abandon any person who has a medically recognized condition that
impedes his ability to support himself. If that person's condition
prevents him from finding work or earning enough to live, society
13. See Amy L. Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program,VA. J. SOC. POLY. & L. 477 (2001)
[hereinafter Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program);Amy L. Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights:
Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and the PoliticalEconomy of Welfare Reform, 63 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 257 (2000) [hereinafter Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights) (offering an

evolutionary theory of how these entrenched attitudes arise); see also Amy L. Wax et al.,
Something for Nothing, Liberal Justice and Welfare Work Requirements, 52 EMORY L.J.
(forthcoming Winter 2003) [hereinafter Wax et al., Something for Nothing].
14. Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program,supra note 13, at 486.
15. Id.
16. See Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Is Equality Passe?Homo Reciprocansand the
Future of EgalitarianPolitics, BOSTON REV., Dec.-Jan. 1999, at 4.
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is pledged to provide him with sufficient resources for dignified
survival.
What this means for our purposes is that any analysis of the
efficiency of putting disabled persons to work, whether through
accommodation mandates or otherwise, must be assessed in light
of society's collective commitment to the disabled. The alternative
to mandates is not a free-for-all in which the public washes its
hands of the disabled and leaves them to their own devices. Rather,
the fallback is a determination to devote a certain portion of
collective resources to support disabled persons who cannot become
independent because existing labor markets provide inadequate
outlets for their productive efforts. Indeed, the default position in
the United States prior to the enactment of the ADA was a standing
offer of benefits for disabled persons who were "unqualified" for
existing jobs. 7 Employers were under no legal obligation to hire or
accommodate these persons, and very often did neither. But society
was willing to step in and take up the slack left by businesses'
unwillingness to hire or accommodate.
The resources set aside for the needy disabled are generated
mostly through some form of taxation. Federal support for the
disabled, for example, is supplied through Supplemental Security
Income (SSI), which is a means-tested program financed from
general tax revenues.'" Another important source of benefits is the
Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) Program. 9
Although OASDI is a work-based, insurance-style program that is
financed through shared worker-employer contributions, it contains
significant elements of redistribution, with revenues collected from
healthy, high-earning employees helping to support disabled former
workers and their disabled and nondisabled dependents.2 ° State
programs, often financed through general taxation, also play some
role.2 '
17. See, e.g., Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1XA) (2000) (defiming the term "disability" as an "inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment").
18. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382h-1385 (2000).
19. See id. §§ 401(a)-434.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., HELEN HERSHKOFF& STEPHEN LOFFREDO, THE RIGHTS OF THE POOR 98-105

(1997) (describing states' general assistance programs for "poor people who are unable to
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The key questions for assessing the ADA's efficiency then become
not whether these resources will be forthcoming from the group, but
how much money the group would have to supply if the ADA did not
exist, and how the burden would be distributed. Also important is
the issue of whether there are any cost-effective methods for
reducing the amount of resources the group must provide or for
generating more resources overall for distribution. In other words,
assuming that the public will honor its implicit pledge to provide
disabled persons with some minimum level of public support
regardless of whether they work, is the system we have in place for
making good on that commitment as cost-effective as it could be? In
answering that question, it must not be forgotten that the workers
the ADA requires employers to hire and accommodate are not
completely unproductive individuals. Rather, they are individuals
who, although perhaps less productive than others who qualify for
similar jobs, are still capable of 'producing value through their
efforts.22
II. LABOR MARKET DISTORTIONS: WHY COMPENSATION FOR THE
DISABLED MAY BE INFLATED

Because markets do not operate perfectly, compensation does
not always reflect productivity. Real-life labor markets are characterized by deviations from what theory-predicts would be observed
with perfectly "market clearing" compensation. Persistent unemployment and hiring hierarchies or "queues" within the ranks of
the unemployed have not been fully explained, but are thought to
result in part from wage structures that fall short of the
neoclassical ideal. Long-standing customs and practices, illunderstood quirks specific to labor markets, and the operation of
human psychology all contribute to these patterns. Morale problems
arise from excessive differentiation in the categorization of workers
find jobs or are unable to work").
22. See, e.g., Scott A. Moss & Daniel A. Malin, Note, Public Funding for Disability
Accommodations: A Rational Solution to RationalDiscriminationand the Disabilities of the
ADA, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 197,203-04 (1998) (suggesting that disability discrimination
"affect[s] all taxpayers, who finance public benefits for the unemployed disabled[,]" but noting
that such discrimination can be regarded as a "harmful externality" only if some who receive
benefits while out of the labor force are capable of working productively).
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doing similar jobs. Workers do not like to see their wages cut in
response to economic downturns and they expect rising trajectories
of pay over time.2" Moreover, the difficulty of monitoring productivity and other information deficits make it hard for employers to
assess each workers' true worth accurately, which impedes precise,
individualized "price discrimination" in setting compensation levels.
Legal rules, such as minimum wage laws and equal pay legislation,
introduce additional distortions by preventing employers from
paying some workers-including some disabled workers with
depressed productivity-what they are worth. All of these factors
impede employers' ability to adjust wages precisely to reflect
productivity for disabled and nondisabled workers alike.
Practices dictating that workers in the same job category receive
similar compensation despite nontrivial differences in productivity
may be particularly important in the case of the disabled.
Significant differences in pay for disabled workers hired into
designated jobs, even in the absence of any legal proscription on
discrimination against them, may prove awkward in light of
prevailing norms. Although some employers might be able to place
persons who are less productive due to a disability into lowerpaying or less demanding job categories than they would occupy if
not disabled, that option will not always prove feasible. For
example, a large urban law firm might not be comfortable hiring an
academically adept, deaf Harvard Law graduate as an "assistant"
for half the salary paid to classmates hired as "associates." If that
option is uncomfortable, the firm may avoid hiring the blind
associate altogether.
To be sure, there are other factors at work that are specific to the
disabled. Employers harbor misconceptions about the disabled that
prevent them from acting "rationally." There is evidence that
cognitive distortions, stereotyping, and the excessive saliency of
disabilities24 interfere with employers' ability to assess disabled job
23. See TRUMAN E. BEWLEY, WHY WAGES DON'TFALLDURINGA RECESSION ch. 21 (1991)

(discussing the effect of wage reductions on worker morale); Bruce Kaufman, Expandingthe
BehavioralFoundations of Labor Economics, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 361 (1999).
24. See Moss & Malin, supra note 22, at 206-09 (discussing rational actors' overestimation of the benefits ofdiscriminating); Michelle A. Travis, PerceivedDisabilities,Social
Cognition, and "Innocent Mistakes," 55 VAND. L. REV. 481 (2002).
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candidates accurately and further undermine rational economic
choices.2 5 Thus, some employers who fail to hire the disabled will be
moved by irrational misconceptions about productivity. Others,
however, will respond to rationalfears that disabled workers will
not prove cost-effective. Some employers who would willingly make
cost-effective, productivity-enhancing accommodations if they
believed they could recoup the costs of those measures by adjusting
pay levels for accommodated workers might fail to do so if compensation were artificially inflated. If that happened, some significant
number of potentially productive disabled persons would not be
hired at all in the absence of the ADA. The result would be that the
productive capacity of the passed-over disabled workers would
never be utilized. Assuming that in many cases net productivity
would be greater than zero, that loss is a deadweight loss.
III. THE SUBSISTENCE GUARANTEE AND IMPERFECT LABOR
MARKETS: How Do THESE AFFECT "REAL EFFICIENCY"?

To illustrate how taking the subsistence guarantee in
combination with labor market distortions and "sticky compensation" as a baseline can change the efficiency calculus for requiring
workplace accommodation of the disabled, consider the following
hypothetical example. Suppose disabled person Mr. A receives $500
per month in disability benefits, and assume that social convention
would recognize $500 as the amount necessary to maintain him at
a minimally decent standard of living. The award of benefits is
supposed to be based on a finding that no job currently exists in the
economy for which Mr. A is now qualified, given his education, age,
and skills. Since, under current law, the disability finding need not
consider the obligation of employers under the ADA to alter job

25. This suggests that repealing minimum wage laws and other legal reforms would
probably only solve some of the problems that lead to idleness among the potentially
productive disabled and loss of their wealth-producing capacities. Cognitive distortions,
misperceptions, inaccurate generalizations, and stereotypes would continue to operate
regardless of whether the law encourages hiring the disabled by making it easier to pay
employees what they are worth. This observation adds weight to the argument herein that
employers should be required by law to take on workers whose productivity is positive but
less than their able-bodied counterparts.
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requirements to accommodate disabled workers,26 the finding of
disability reflects the inability to perform existing jobs in an
"unaccommodated"job market. In practice, however, the finding is
also made against the backdrop of laws that would block an
employer from paying Mr. A a wage below a minimum amount,
even if that lower wage appropriately reflected Mr. A's net lower
productivity on the job as well as the costs of accommodating him
to enable him to be (more) productive. But even if Mr. A's actual
performance would entitle him to a salary above the minimum, the
employer might not feel free to reduce Mr. A's compensation to a
level significantly below that received by other employees performing similar jobs. Thus, employer X could easily find himself paying
Mr. A more than he is "worth," such that employing Mr. A is a net
loss for X. Although Mr. A is capable of generating a net positive
output and employing him potentially could be profitable, employer
X may nevertheless resist hiring him because employing him is in
fact not profitable at the wage the employer would be forced to pay.
Enforcing an accommodation mandate can make sense, however,
even if the employer would lose money by employing Mr. A.
Suppose that employer X has vacancies for a job that ordinarily
pays $600 per week. Suppose that if X spends nothing to
accommodate Mr. A in the workplace, Mr. A's productivity on that
particular job would be so low that it would be worth paying him
only $200 per week. If X were to invest $50 per week in
accommodation-related measures involving job restructuring,
special equipment, and the like, Mr. A's output would be doubled
from $200 to $400. After paying for the accommodation, it would be
cost-effective for X to hire Mr. A at a higher salary of $350 per
week.
It follows that if the law requires that X hire Mr. A, it will be
cost-effective to accommodate him. If Mr. A is not accommodated to
the tune of $50 per week, his productivity will be considerably
26. For discussion of the concept that benefits eligibility is in practice broader than the
law strictly allows, see supra note 8. See also Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S.
795, 796 (1999) ("[Tlhe SSA does not take into account the possibility of 'reasonable
accommodation' in determining SSDI eligibility."); Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability
Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans with DisabilitiesAct and FederalDisability
Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003 (1998); Jerry L. Mashaw, Against First Principles,
31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211 (1994).
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lower. An expenditure of $50 per week doubles Mr. A's productivity
and justifies raising his salary from $200 to $350. Because X is
constrained to pay him $600, the accommodation expenditure is
worthwhile from the employer's point of view, because without it
the employer would pay him $400 per week more than he is worth
($600 - $200), whereas with the accommodation, the employer will
be out only $250 per week ($600 - ($400 - $50)). For the very same

reason, however-that is, because the accommodation enhances
Mr. A's productivity by more than the cost of the accommodation
-hiring and accommodating Mr. A is efficient overall. Without the
accommodation, society as a whole will forgo the net gain in utility
from Mr. A's accommodated effort on the job. Therefore, assuming
that we require that Mr. A be hired, he should be hired with
accommodation.
Should we demand that employer X hire Mr. A, even at a
potentially inflated wage, and even if employing Mr. A at $600 per
week might not be cost-effective for that employer? If we look in
isolation at the economics of X's workplace hiring decision, it is
understandable why critics of the ADA might suggest that hiring
Mr. A and accommodating his disability are not "efficient" moves.
But that assertion fails to take into account the divergence the ADA
creates between private and public costs. It turns out that, in cases
like this, what is inefficient for the employer is efficient for society
as a whole.
We start with the understanding that the option of paying Mr. A
$350 after expending $50 on accommodation-the cost-effective
strategy-is not open to X. The pay for the job into which Mr. A is
hired is $600. Even if that is well above the minimum wage, we
assume that the employer would find it difficult to pay less. It goes
without saying that if X must pay that amount to a person in that
job, he would prefer to hire a nondisabled person who can generate
a profit at that wage, rather than Mr. A, who generates a loss. By
hiring Mr. A, the employer will suffer a loss from employing
someone whose productivity does not justify his cost. The employer
might try to recoup those lost profits in several ways. If some of his
workers are supplied inelastically, the employer will try to pass on
the costs by reducing other workers' average wage; or, if labor is
supplied elastically, he will lay off nondisabled workers from jobs
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in which they would otherwise be efficiently employed. 27 Alternatively, some productive workers might be forced to reduce their
hours of work.
The overall result of these compensatory moves may be a net
reduction in total wealth or welfare for an employer and/or his
workers. It could be argued that this net reduction will never come
to pass: the fact that hiring Mr. A hurts employer X will excuse that
employer from hiring him in the first place. The ADA does not
require employers to hire disabled workers who are a losing
proposition. But, based on this hypothetical, it is far from clear that
courts would exempt employers from the ADA's requirements in
cases like this. The fact that Mr. A performs his job inefficiently
does not necessarily prevent him from persuading a court that he
can perform the job's core requirements. And the accommodation
that allows him to perform more efficiently may not look like it
imposes an "undue burden" on these facts. If Mr. A is not
unproductive, and the suggested accommodations enhance his
productivity significantly, requiring the employer to make them
may appear quite reasonable, especially in light of what Mr. A
actually earns.
That the employer might lose money on Mr. A, however, does not
mean that employing him is inefficient overall. Although hiring Mr.
A may not be cost-effective for the employer within the constraints
established by law and the reality of the workplace, it may be
efficient for society as a whole if Mr. A goes to work. The analysis
cannot be complete without factoring in the money that must
inevitably be collected from taxpayers and disbursed by the public
to support Mr. A if he cannot find a job, go to work, and contribute
his productive efforts to generating the wealth necessary to support
himself. If X does not hire Mr. A, Mr. A will remain idle. If he
remains idle, his potentially productive contribution will be entirely
lost. If that contribution is lost, society must foot the entire bill for
his support without any cost sharing or mitigation. In effect, Mr. A
loses the opportunity to help defray his own cost of living, and that
burden falls entirely on others.

27. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 18.
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The terms of our hypothetical suggest that Mr. A's efforts are
worth something-he is capable of achieving substantial net
positive productivity by working, and in particular by working at
the job we have identified for employer X. Even if he is not
accommodated, his net productivity is hardly negligible, as evinced
by X's judgment that it would be worth paying him $200 per week
to perform the job at issue. He is even more productive if certain
changes are made in the job or at the workplace. A $50 accommodation causes his productivity to jump to a level that would
justify a $350 per week salary.
But a society committed to Mr. A's subsistence will make sure, as
noted above, that he receives at least $500 per week. If X does not
hire Mr. A and he cannot find work, he will receive $500 in
government benefits. That $500 will be collected through taxation
of some kind. Depending on the type of levy chosen, that money will
come out of the pockets of workers (through income taxes or worker
contribution taxes); consumers (through sales taxes); property
owners (through property taxes); or other selected groups ofcitizens
(through user fees). Although the employer himself will be out of
pocket $250 per week by employing and accommodating Mr. A at a
wage of $600, the taxpayers will save the $500 in benefits Mr. A no
longer receives from the government, for a net gain to society
overall of $250. What makes up the difference is the value
generated by Mr. A if he goes to work, which is lost if he does not.
Although taxpayers win and employer X loses, the net result is
positive. In other words, the ADA requirement that Mr. A be hired
and accommodated, under those circumstances, may produce a
result that is more cost-effective than not imposing those mandates.
Economists will object that this analysis is too simple: hiring
mandates introduce costly"distortions" in labor markets that must
be factored into the equation. It can be argued, however, that our
hypothetical does fully account for such distortionary effects. The
equation arguably is complete by looking at Mr. A's productivity
(utilized or forgone), the employer's costs of compensation and
accommodation, and society's bill for supporting Mr. A if he is not
employed. By calculating the employer's out-of-pocket costs from
hiring Mr. A instead of a more productive nondisabled worker, our
example would appear to take the measure of the loss in produc-
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tivity that results from that mandated displacement. To be sure,
the employer may well try to pass on the extra costs to his other
employees or to consumers. But that does not alter the conclusion
that hiring Mr. A still looks worthwhile from the point of view of
the system as a whole, despite the costs it imposes on businesses,
customers, and workers.
When examined in light of the forgoing analysis, the ADA's
overall predicted effects on total social wealth and well-being
become less clear cut and more equivocal and contingent. The claim
here is not that the ADA will always be efficient, only that the
ADA's purportedly negative impact on overall social welfare is not
as obvious as free-market, neoclassical economists suggest. In
predicting that mandates that disturb the "rational" operation of
labor markets will always produce welfare-reducing inefficiencies,
these analysts conveniently overlook the fact that, without the
ADA, many disabled persons might be wastefully unemployed and
would require support from the rest of us. Factoring in these
observations suggests that the answer to whether the ADA is
efficient may depend on many contingent facts about labor market
structures and disabled workers' skills. Although the mandates
might generate a net loss in some circumstances, in others they
would not. The question comes down to whether and when the
"distortions" created by requiring employers to hire the disabled at
prevailing levels of compensation for designated positions will
outweigh the public savings that result when disabled persons are
enabled to contribute to their own support.
In attempting to get a handle on whether the ADA ends up
making society as a whole better or worse off, it may help to look in
more detail at the burden imposed on the able-bodied population
with or without the statute in place. As noted above, some of the
costs of supporting disabled people in the absence of the ADA will
be paid through programs that are formally structured as worker
self-insurance, such as OASDI. The costs of other programs, such
as SSI and state benefits programs, are met out of general tax
revenues. As noted, despite its designation as an "insurance"
program, OASDI has a systematic redistributive component.
Therefore, the public commitment to supporting the disabled visits
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an effective "wage reduction" on many or most workers in the form
of the taxes necessary to support these disbursements.
On one side of the equation are the losses that may result from
forcing employers to hire disabled workers-costs that nondisabled
workers may be forced to bear on the front end in the form of lower
pay, less desirable jobs, shorter working hours, or increased
unemployment. But absent the ADA, nondisabled workers will bear
costs on the back end in the form of higher taxes that are needed to
fund the disability programs that support unemployed disabled
workers. The tax-and-transfer option may itself have distortive
effects: transfer payments can reduce incentives for the disabled to
seek work aggressively," which may depress their levels of
employment and productivity even further. Taxes on the working
population, whether disabled or not, that are used to fund disability
benefits also reduce incentives to work across the board, which
further increases the costs of any alternative to an ADA-type
regime. The question once again comes down to whether the
magnitude of the costs on one side of the ledger will necessarily be
greater than those on the other, taking into account the welfare of
workers and the burdens and benefits on the system overall. The
analysis cannot look in isolation at the effect of the ADA on labor
markets. It must also consider the existence of alternative
programs for the disabled and how those programs influence
taxpayer and beneficiary work patterns. The situation must be
analyzed as a whole.
To be sure, a complete analysis of whether the overall effects of
the tax-and-transfer option are likely to be better or worse than
direct regulation through the ADA must take cognizance of a
broader debate on the relative virtues of redistribution through
direct regulation versus paying subsidies from taxes collected on the
proceeds of unregulated markets.2 9 The ADA shunts resources
towards the disabled by regulating the workplace to make jobs more
available to them, whereas traditional benefits leave the employ28. See Mashaw, supra note 27.
29. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?
Clarifyingthe Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in RedistributingIncome, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 821 (2000); Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for
Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000).
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ment sphere (relatively) undisturbed, and transfer funds collected
through taxes directly to disabled persons. The tax-and-transfer
alternative appears superior on the simplistic assumption that
mandated hiring of the disabled effects a one-for-one displacement
of more productive, able-bodied persons. Although those persons
must pay part of their earnings to help support the disabled, it
makes more sense to tax the more productive to support the less
productive than to allow the latter to displace the former in the
workforce.
Although a large body of literature exists that compares
regulatory and transfer options, the virtues and vices of the
alternatives are a matter of some contention. The conventional
wisdom that tax-and-transfer is more efficient than direct
regulation is based on ideal assumptions about well-functioning
markets and economically rational behavior. That position has not
gone unchallenged and its validity is acknowledged to vary
depending on setting and circumstance. 0 When, as with disability
programs, the options are superimposed on a regulated or less than
perfectly rational market scheme, the advantages of transfers over
direct regulation cannot be predicted with confidence on first
principles. In particular, it is far from clear that hiring the disabled
will effect a proportional reduction in work by the more productive
able-bodied that will always cause net losses to exceed gains.
Moreover, the discussion so far has taken no account of the social
and psychological benefits of workplace participation that accrue to
the disabled under the ADA but not under the tax-and-transfer
regime. These must also be charged in the ADA's favor.31
At bottom, however, theoretical insights cannot be dispositive:
which route costs more in the context of disability policy is
ultimately an empirical matter. Contingent factors that may affect
the comparative efficiency of regulatory and transfer alternatives
in the disability setting include the prevalence of different types of
disabilities, the spectrum ofjobs that are available in the economy,
the productivity of people with various disabilities as they perform
available jobs, and the technology that develops to accommodate
30. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 29; Sanchirico, supra note 29.
31. It should be added, however, that those benefits may be counterbalanced by the loss
of leisure that more work for the disabled entails.
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those persons. Other contingent factors include: the cost of those
accommodations, the effect. of those accommodations on productivity, the costs of supporting disabled persons who do not work,
and the generosity of benefits. Also potentially important are the
incentive effects on work effort for different segments of the
population from the taxation needed to support generous benefits
programs and the incentive effects on the disabled from receiving
benefits. Finally, it is not clear that the sum total of jobs is fixed, to
the point that employment for the disabled spells unemployment for
others. Rather, an increase in the effective supply of labor might
result in more persons being employed overall.
Against the uncertainty of how these factors stack up in practice,
no one option is clearly superior in every circumstance. It is at least
reasonable to conclude that mandating the hiring of disabled
workers and reducing the employment tax burden generally might
sometimes prove better than taxing able-bodied workers to support
the idle, even if some able-bodied persons work fewer hours under
the mandate. If many disabled persons will not find work without
the ADA, and if that in turn discourages other disabled persons
from pursuing employment by making non-work more normatively
acceptable, the forgone productivity of the unemployed disabled
population could impose considerable social costs and overwhelm
countervailing efficiency gains.
It may be objected that the hypothetical case of Mr. A above has
been rigged to indulge the rosy assumption that hiring and
accommodating him will be cost-effective for society overall. Mr. A,
however, is not necessarily representative of most disabled persons.
Does the ADA operate efficiently for disabled persons who are less
productive than Mr. A, or who do not improve productivity with
accommodation, or who require expensive accommodations that
may outweigh productivity gains? If accommodation costs exceed
productivity gains, adding someone to the labor force would appear
to be a losing proposition not only for the employer but also for the
system as a whole. The divergence between private and social costs
disappears and net gains become negative. At the extremes, even
a complete deregulation of wage markets would offer no relief: the
person simply costs more to put to work than to maintain in
idleness outside the labor market. In that case, hiring and accom-

2003]

DISABILITY, RECIPROCITY, AND "REAL' EFFICIENCY"

1441

modating a disabled worker would make no economic sense at all.
Thus, jobs in which salaries are high and compensation is "sticky,"
may generate a greater risk of this type of inefficient result.
Consider the example of Mr. B, who produces negligible value
without special accommodation and would not be worth hiring into
any job at any rate of pay under those circumstances. Assume
further, however, that an accommodation that costs $200 per week
enables Mr. B to produce slightly more than $150 in value for that
period. If an accommodation could be made without any cost, or if
accommodation costs were subsidized, the employer would pay him
$150 per week. Factoring in accommodation costs, the employer is
guaranteed to be out at least $50 per week. It should be clear that
employing Mr. B can never be cost-effective, regardless of the level
of compensation and type and degree of accommodation, so even a
zero pay rate would fail to make employing him economically
worthwhile. Unlike with Mr. A, employing Mr. B in the job at issue
will produce a deadweight loss overall regardless of the rate of pay.
Not only will the employer lose money, but the system as a whole
will too.
It is important to note, however, that even in these circumstances
taxpayers might choose to mandate that employers hire and
accommodate Mr. B. That is, taxpayers might vote to bring persons
like Mr. B within the scope of the ADA, despite the fact that this
would be the inefficient result in that setting. The key here is to
realize that the ADA permits taxpayers to externalize or shift costs
from themselves onto employers. Their incentive to do so exists in
settings in which the ADA operates efficiently (as with Mr. A) or
inefficiently (as with Mr. B). The point once again is that Mr. B's
cost of support-say $500-must be paid by someone. If Mr. B is
hired by employer X and paid Y dollars, that means that fewer
dollars must be supplied by the public to support Mr. B. If Y is less
than $500 (that is, less than a subsistence wage), the public saves
at least ($500 - Y). The taxpayer still comes out ahead, even if the
government agrees to "make up the difference" by supplementing
Mr. B's meager salary with a benefits payment worth ($500 - Y). If
Y (which is Mr. B's salary) is greater than $500, the taxpayers are
spared the entire cost of Mr. B's support. In either case, the cost to
the employer is Y + $50 and the total cost to the system is ($500 -
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Y) + (Y + $50), or $550. Although taxpayers save money, they have
shifted the expense of Mr. B's upkeep to the employer, who must
now bear an "inefficient" extra $50 burden. It makes no sense for
Mr. B to go to work at a net cost of $550 to the system when he will
cost the system only $500 if he does not work. Because the ADA
invites the public to impose a negative "externality" on employer X
in this case, however, it is no surprise that the outcome is an
inefficient one. This is just one example of a setting in which a
transaction that generates a negative externality yields an
inefficient result.
To be sure, it could be argued that the "undue burden" language
in the ADA might excuse the employer from hiring and
accommodating Mr. B on these facts.3 2 After all, the accommodation
negates Mr. B's effective productivity. But if the compensation paid
to Mr. B significantly exceeds his productivity and dwarfs the costs
of accommodating him, and if the accommodation does indeed boost
his productivity (even though it does not do so cost effectively), this
might create an impression that the accommodation is efficient
overall. So the outcome of any challenge to ADA-mandated
employment plus accommodation on facts like these is not a forgone
conclusion.
Yet another possibility worth considering is that of a disabled
person who is productive at a low level without accommodation, but
whose productivity could be enhanced by an accommodation that is
prohibitively expensive. For example, suppose Mr. C could produce
$50 worth of value without a requested accommodation, but $100
with a $200 proposed accommodation. If Mr. C must be paid more
than $50, the employer loses either way. This scenario differs from
that posed by Mr. B, however: society only loses under the latter
scenario (accommodation for Mr. C), but not under the former (no
accommodation), although the employer will be out-of-pocket under
both scenarios. Thus, despite its positive effect on gross productivity, the accommodation the employee seeks has a negative effect
on net productivity and should not be made. Yet it is unclear
whether the ADA would get the right result here or whether
accommodation would be excused under these circumstances. A
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (2000).
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person whose productivity is greater than zero, but not very high,
might demand an expensive accommodation that enhances his gross
productivity significantly (but reduces his net productivity overall)
because it appears to make him a more valuable employee.
Although granting that request makes little economic sense, the
accommodation may seem worthwhile to a court if it makes the
disabled person appear to produce more. A court is even more likely
to be misled if the person's relatively low productivity is masked by
his (artificially inflated) compensation. The costs of the requested
accommodation may not be very large relative to the employee's
apparent worth as reflected by that yardstick, which is salient to
courts. Thus, jobs in which salaries are high and compensation is
"sticky" may generate a greater risk of this type of inefficient result.
Consider the example of a blind lawyer hired by a large urban
law firm. A reader or assistant may enable the lawyer to do legal
work, but the assistant may prove so expensive that the productivity gains are effectively wiped out. Yet because the lawyer is paid
many times what the assistant earns, and the assistant undeniably
enhances the lawyer's output, the accommodation may appear
reasonable. Once again, the picture presented to a court will be
colored by a level of pay for the job that is geared to what most ablebodied lawyers earn. And there may be some blind lawyers who
more than earn their keep despite the costs of assisting them. But
whether a demand for accommodation in cases like this would pass
muster under the ADA depends on how the court analyzed the
issue. It is not hard to imagine how a result that is cost-ineffective
even by the criterion of "real efficiency" might emerge.
IV. DISABILITY, Low ABILITY, AND RECIPROCAL OBLIGATIONS
In addition to its implications for the design of disability policies
and the wisdom of the ADA, the discussion so far suggests broader
ramifications for policies regarding unskilled labor generally.
As noted above, central to the idea of reciprocation in the social
and economic sphere is the view that the collective should commit
to bringing all individuals up to a baseline level of well-being,
provided those persons make some reasonable effort to contribute
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to their own support through work.3" In addition to medical
disabilities, low skills and unfortunate life circumstances can
compromise people's ability to meet labor market demands and to
achieve minimum levels of economic well-being through work in the
paid economy. Factors that cause persons to do poorly in the labor
market include inadequate education, deficient upbringing, low
intelligence, lack of talent, bad luck, drug addiction, and imprudent
choices. At least some of these factors might be regarded as
effectively outside the individual's control, thus rendering someone
"deserving" of assistance within the reciprocity paradigm. Even
those whose current prospects have been compromised by poor past
choices might be regarded as entitled to help under a less exacting
version of the reciprocity principle that makes room for forgiveness
and second chances. 3 '
In any event, there will always be some apparently "able-bodied"
persons who cannot realistically achieve self-sufficiency through
work despite good faith efforts and a strong desire to participate in
the workforce. Some workers are unable to find employment or fulltime employment. Others can only secure and hold down jobs that
do not pay enough to maintain themselves or support a family. Like
many of the disabled, such persons are potentially productive and
thus, in some sense, employable, but not economically independent.
A commitment to social reciprocity recognizes a collective obligation
to make up the difference between what these "bottom-rung"
workers can command on the market and what is necessary to
secure a minimally decent standard of living. As noted, reciprocity
appears to create a kind of sliding scale of obligation that commits
society to maintaining a floor below which no one will be allowed to
fall so long as he expends reasonable efforts on his own behalf. If a
person's relatively low productivity prevents him from achieving
independent self-support, the collective must somehow close the
gap.
How can that be done? Several existing and proposed programs
are consistent with honoring this commitment and its conditions.
Congress has recently expanded and revised the Earned Income
33. See Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program,supra note 13, at 477, 478-85.
34. See id.
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Tax Credit (EITC), which represents a scheme for "supported
work." The EITC boosts worker income above a minimum threshold
through tax abatements and refundable tax credits.35 The EITC
comports roughly with reciprocity principles by offering help only
to those who enter the paid labor market. Proposals for wage
subsidies for low income workers operate along similar lines: by
reserving benefits for workers, they recognize the importance and
value of work but make good on a collective commitment to raise
workers above the poverty line. 6 Exactly how these programs
should be designed and administered, and which options are most
consistent with our theoretical and political obligations, are
debatable questions. Moreover, the difficulties of administering
such proposals without creating wasteful windfalls and generating
perverse incentives are well-known and have been extensively
reviewed elsewhere. 7 The basic idea, however, is that every person
who fulfills social expectations by performing a reasonable amount
of labor should be able to take care of basic needs. The route to
accomplishing this goal may be difficult, but the principle is clear
enough.
Although the recognition of an obligation to assist persons who
are needy despite their best efforts would seem to extend to those
unable to command a living wage due to low ability or lack of skills
as well as to those with a medical disability, in actual practice there
may be reasons to accord these categories distinct treatment. It is
often easier to establish the link between low productivity and a
medical cause than between low productivity and lack of native
talent because it is harder to distinguish the latter from plain old
35. See 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2000).
36. See EDMUND PHELPS, REWARDING WORK How TO RESTORE PARTICIPATION AND SELF

SUPPORTTO FREE ENTERPRISE (1997). But see Anne Alstott, Work vs. Freedom, 108 YALE L.J.
967 (1999) (critiquing wage and job subsidy proposals, including Phelps' ideas).
37. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 480-94 (proposing a grant to set up "special
workshops" for the disabled); PHELPS, supra note 36, at 35 (designing governmental wage
subsidies to minimize employer incentives to lower wages); Alstott, supranote 36 (discussing

windfalls to employers as well as other administrative issues and information problems
surrounding wage subsidies); Mashaw, supra note 27 (arguing that replacing the ADA with
a funded mandate requiring the employment of the disabled will better society); Moss &
Malin,supranote 22, at 197, 234 (discussing the problem of "buying the base," which "refers
to the possibility that the funding program will merely bankroll [those] accommodations that
would have been made in the absence of funding").

1446

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1421

laziness or from dysfunction that is amenable to an exercise of will.
There is irreducible moral hazard in recognizing entitlement to
assistance for failure on the job market without an objectively verifiable cause. The reasons most persons without obvious disabilities
fail in the job market are a matter of hot dispute, with opinions
differing on whether poor performance is usually due to volitional
factors or more commonly results from a combination of innate and
environmental conditions that are beyond persons' effective control.
The fault lines in these debates implicate deep disagreements about
human responsibility itself. Some deny that the welfare system
should penalize behaviors such as educational failure, drug use,
criminal conduct, or bearing children too early or outside of
marriage that tend to compromise employability. Others adhere to
the more traditional view that, because these behaviors are within
the individual's effective control, their consequences should not give
rise to standing entitlements to public assistance.
Assuming, however, that at least some forms of job failure can
fairly be regarded as not a worker's "fault" or as effectively beyond
a worker's control, it is unclear why society should not treat the
causes of those failures like medical disabilities for purposes of
redistribution and support. But the similarities between the
disabled and some persons who fail at self-support for other reasons
for which they are not entirely responsible suggest that the
treatment accorded these groups should converge in more ways
than one. If some of the nondisabled who perform poorly in the job
market should be treated like the disabled by being offered public
help if they need it, then why should not the disabled be treated
like the nondisabled in other respects? Nondisabled persons are
expected to seek and perform work to the extent they are able. If
they fail despite reasonable efforts through no fault of their own,
society supports them. But the support is forthcoming only on the
assumption that they have already tried and failed. They are not
excused from working altogether simply by virtue of possessing
traits that make it difficult for them to find work or to earn enough
to be entirely self-supporting.
If aid for the nondisabled is made conditional on good faith efforts
to contribute to self-support, why do we not expect the same from
medically disabled persons? It is hard to see why persons with
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conventionaldisabilitiesshould ever be categorically excused from
expending the reasonable work effort that we routinely expect from
persons who have difficulties on the job market for other reasons.
Persons whose paucity of marketable skills prevent them from
obtaining jobs that pay enough to support themselves or their
families, regardless of the cause of that deficit, are nonetheless
expected to go to work. This expectation suggests that we should
jettison the notion that having a medical disability excuses nonwork
altogether. To be sure, the question of whether a medically disabled
person should be expected to work makes no sense if a medical
disability is defined strictly as a condition that prevents a person
from doing any work at all in the paid economy. But, as already
noted, the group of persons who receive disability benefits even
under this legal definition almost certainly includes some who could
do existing work and many more who could work productively if
accommodated.
There has been much debate in the wake of the ADA about
whether disabled persons have a "right" to work.88 Very little
discussion has been devoted to whether disabled persons should be
obligated to work towards the goal of self-support just like other
persons. Reciprocity principles suggest that the disabled should be
treated the same as everyone else, subject to the standing collective
pledge to make up the difference between what they can achieve by
dint of their own efforts and what they need. Asking that the
disabled try to work, however, gives rise to a further question: Does
accepting disabled persons' duty to work if they can entail an
obligation by society to make work available to them? Is the proper
quid pro quo a pledge on society's part to redesign existing jobs or
create new ones to accommodate disabled workers? Which alternative comports best with reciprocity's requirements: excusing persons
with medical impairments from working altogether if they cannot
manage to obtain jobs within existing labor markets, or striving to
put as many people as possible to work by requiring employers to
38. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 26 (arguing that the ADA created a "right to work");
Gregory S. Kavka, Disability and the Right to Work, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES:
EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 186-87 (Leslie

Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000). Contra EPSTEIN, supra note 3; WALTER OLSON, THE
EXCUSE FACTORY: HOW EMPLOYMENT LAW IS PARALYZING THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (1997).
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make the kinds of accommodations that would enable more disabled
persons to work and work productively?
The latter seems more effectively to vindicate the notion that
everyone should exert reasonable efforts to contribute something to
social production and self-maintenance. Reciprocity stresses mutual
obligation. Moreover, recognizing that disabled persons should work
and that society should accommodate them would in practice
enhance the sum total of social resources by shifting the disabled as
a group away from a norm of non-work towards one of work.
Disability benefits programs, as the last bastion for the severely
impaired, would shrink in size. The social expectation for most
disabled persons would move towards employment of some kind.
The duty to work should arguably not be seen as absolute; rather,
it runs out at the extremes. So should the duty to accommodate.
There is a strong case to be made that society need not offer
accommodations to the hypothetical Mr. B or Mr. C described
above. That is, Mr. B or Mr. C should not be entitled to accommodations that would enhance their "productivity" viewed in
isolation, if factoring in the accommodation costs generates a net
loss overall. Indeed, perhaps Mr. B should be excused from work
altogether because his employment could never be cost-effective.
Society might elect to excuse non-work on the part of persons who
are more expensive to keep at work than to support in idleness.
Correspondingly, society should perhaps be relieved of the
obligation to provide work to individuals who are not net
productive, regardless of how much those persons want to work and
how much they believe that working will benefit them. There would
still be many cases, however, in which the offer of a reasonable
accommodation would both enhance social welfare overall and best
comport with the commands of social reciprocity. In those cases,
accommodations should be forthcoming.
This discussion potentially sheds light on yet another important
aspect of the debate surrounding the ADA and how it operates in
real-world markets. The discussion so far suggests that a core
commitment to the disabled-and to others who struggle in the
world of work-need not be all-or-nothing. Rather, fidelity to the
motivating principles of reciprocity would dictate a graduated
response that is geared to the shortfall between what an individual
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can command by dint of his own efforts and the subsistence
minimum. Despite the existence of minimum wage laws and the
EITC, many of the disabled (as well as other nondisabled workers)
cannot fully support themselves through work, either because they
are unable to hold down a full-time job, or because the minimum
wage, even as supplemented through various programs, is not
currently a "living wage" for some families. 9 Likewise, even in a
deregulated environment and despite productivity-boosting and
cost-effective accommodations, someone like Mr. A in the example
above might still look to the rest of us for some assistance. By
hypothesis, if A were paid a salary that reflected his true output, he
would earn much less than the $600 he is assigned in the example
and less than he needs to live in dignity and without want. Thus, in
a perfectly free market, the nondisabled population would often be
called upon to contribute some amount towards the support of
persons like Mr. A to the extent their productivity does not warrant
paying them enough to support themselves.
Moves towards deregulating worker compensation-such as the
repeal of the minimum wage and equal pay laws so desired by freemarketeers-would likely require society to pay more, not less, to
honor its obligations towards the "worthy" poor. Of course, not
every disabled person will require assistance to achieve an
acceptable standard of living. Some workers, even assuming their
disability compromises their productivity, might still earn enough
even on a deregulated wage market to cover basic needs. The
reciprocity paradigm does not demand that these individuals be
brought up to the level of compensation received by everyone in the
samejob category. Rather, it contemplates something more modest:
that all persons be guaranteed a decent minimum if they put
forward what is deemed a reasonable effort to pay their own way,
and their failure to achieve self-sufficiency is not their own fault.
These insights suggest a number of directions for modifying and
revising national policy for the disabled and for low wage workers
generally. First, the government should take seriously a commitment to subsidize the earnings of the disabled as part of a broader,
39. See Wax,A Reciprocal Welfare Program,supra note 13, at 477,501.09 (discussing this

problem of the 'working poor").
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unified approach towards guaranteeing that all low income workers
who satisfy minimum requirements receive an adequate income.'0
Second, we should consider moving away from benefits programs
that rely on bright-line, all-or-nothing findings of disability, and
which excuse work and pledge complete support for those who meet
the threshold criteria while offering no assistance to those who do
not. Although creating categories of partial disability is potentially
very cumbersome and might be rejected on administrative grounds
alone, it should be taken seriously and examined carefully as more
consistent with the priorities identified here. Third, there should be
a renewed emphasis on rehabilitation, vocational counseling, and
job placement for the disabled, as well as on programs to educate
employers and help them integrate and utilize disabled workers
more effectively. Such programs are more consistent with a baseline
expectation that all persons belong in the workforce unless clearly
unsuited for any kind of gainful employment.
Finally, the ADA must be reassessed in light of a basic structure
that imposes on employers the costs of mandates that benefit
society as a whole. As noted at the start of this Article, the ADA is
not necessarily inefficient overall, given the basic safety net and
regulatory programs to which our society is committed. Rather, its
principal design flaw is that it forces employers to pay costs that
should arguably be borne by everyone. Against the backdrop of reallife labor markets and society's pledge to help the disabled, the ADA
effectively shifts costs from taxpayers to employers. As noted,
employers will not always be able to adjust compensation
downward towards a "market-clearing wage" for those of their
disabled employees who are not as productive as others. This
generates a "disconnect" between employers' lack of interest in
hiring the disabled, and society's (and taxpayers') interestwhether cost-effective or not, depending on the circumstances-in
putting disabled persons to work to help defray the burden of their
40. Those minimum requirements mayjustly vary for different subgroups. For example,

it may not be reasonable to expect mothers of young children and persons with certain types
of medical problems to work as many hours as able-bodied, single, childless adults. See Wax,
A Reciprocal Welfare Program,supra note 13, at 477, 491-97; see also Wax et al., Something
forNothing, supra note 13. For a different perspective on a unified approach to policy for low
income workers, see Matthew Diller, Entitlement andExclusion: The Role ofDisabilityin the
Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361 (1996).
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support. What is rational and cost-effective for society as a whole
or, alternatively, for taxpayers who must pay the cost of disability
benefits programs-to have disabled persons "earn their own way"
or at least appear to do so-may not always be cost-effective for the
employer. But even when putting disabled persons to work is not
efficient for the system as a whole, taxpayers may still (perversely)
want to off-load the costs of supporting the disabled on private
employers by enforcing hiring mandates.
That employers who save society money by hiring the disabled
may end up losing money themselves suggests that the employer
mandates embodied in the ADA are vulnerable to political abuse.
One point of this Article is that these externalities may sometimes
create an efficient result. Sometimes, however, they will not, and
there is no inherent guarantee that the outcome will be happy in
every case or in most cases. The balance between efficiency and
inefficiency will in part depend on how courts construe the ADA's
commands. Because taxpayers enjoy a benefit at the expense of
employers under the ADA regardless of whether the statute
operates efficiently, political forces might tilt towards overly
generous mandates. That is a result worth guarding against, and
suggests that some thought should be given to alleviating the
burdens the ADA imposes on businesses or at least to forthrightly
acknowledging the cost-shifting inherent in the ADA's design.
The analysis presented here supports the view that the mandates
of the ADA lack fundamental fairness and threaten to place too
onerous a burden on employers. Reform in the precise terms of the
ADA and the way it is enforced-for example, by relaxing the
standard of reasonable accommodation or tightening the definition
of core ability to perform the job-may help a little, but can only
take us so far. When putting more disabled persons to work makes
economic sense, it may be better to try to find ways to help
employers defray the costs of accomplishing that goal. In this vein,
Richard Epstein has proposed grants to businesses willing to hire
and accommodate the disabled.4 ' Other proposals to subsidize the
hiring of low-productivity workers42 might be extended to the
41. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 493-94.
42. See PHELPS, supra note 36, at 35.
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disability context. Leaving aside the pragmatic pros and cons of
specific proposals, however, the main purpose of this Article is to
show how the current design of the ADA can be faulted for
confounding the true costs and benefits of the valuable social project
of enabling the disabled to contribute to their own support.
Transparency in assessing the ADA's consequences for all parties
affected by the statute's commands, although perhaps not fully
achievable, might inspire a more careful rethinking of the ADA's
design and effects.

